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The broken years: 




Fritz Glockner / Fondo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes 
	  Translated by Elizabeth Polli	  
 
 
The history of the different, corrupt illegal actions committed by the dictatorial governments of 
the majority of Latin American countries has been widely disseminated, represented, studied, 
and analyzed. These historical processes have been referred to as “Dirty Wars”, and with their 
mention it is common to hear about the horror, which took place in Argentina, Guatemala, Chile, 
El Salvador, Uruguay or Brazil, among other countries. Nevertheless, in the case of Mexico, few 
people or perhaps no one could imagine that the strategy that is frequently referred to as the 
“Dirty War” was carried out in equal fashion by the Mexican State. 
 It might seem implausible to imagine that the Mexican government, with its civilian 
leaders, elected by an apparent democratic system, could have carried out corrupt illegal actions 
against those opposing the political system, or against their critics, or against those citizens who 
spoke up to protest injustice. How can one imagine that in Mexico the practice of forced 
disappearance could have been implemented? Could the so-called death flights possibly have 
existed in Mexican territory? 
What is curious about this topic, is that Mexico is precisely the first Latin American 
country that put into place the strategies learned at the various North American counter-
insurgency schools, as was the case of “The School of the Americas”, situated in the thin strip of 
land in the Panama Canal. The Mexican governments used their military and their secret police 
to develop in earnest the teachings of repression instilled at those training centers.    
It is thus that we see the first disappearance of a politician in Latin America in the figure 
of Professor Epifanio Avilés Rojas, on the 19th of May, 1969, in the State of Guerrero, Mexico, 
a circumstance which remains unsolved to this day, one which took place several years before 
the practice of forced disappearance was exercised in Argentina or Chile.     
While the first “Death Flights” are carried out in Mexico around 1974, in the case of 
Argentina they began in 1976. Therefore, the famous experience of “offering a feast to the 
sharks” had its debut in Mexican territory.   
In the case of torture, it is the Mexican military and police force that implement the use of 
mineral water during interrogation sessions. Not only were these tactics simply evil, why not just 
say it was also ingenious to apply chili powder during those sessions, a creative way to enhance 
what they had learned in the halls of “The School of the Americas.” 
 How is it possible that the practice of torture, forced disappearance and assassination has 
remained in the dark for so many years in Mexico? 
  Notwithstanding, what we understand today as the period of the “Dirty Wars”, 
those years of repression and terror experienced under the different Latin American 
dictatorships, would have to be clarified academically in the case of Mexico, where the term 
“Low Intensity War” better refers to the strategy of confronting and eliminating the opposition. 
 This very term was used during the time of the Reagan presidency, particularly from 1982 on. If 
we scrutinize, however, the concepts covered in the counter-insurgency instruction manual itself, 
dated 1967 – the one the South American students in the aforementioned “School of the 
Americas” studied, in which the different actions to follow stand out and are described, such as 
to contain, to annihilate, to subdue, or to eliminate the different opposition groups through 
various counter-insurgency actions, all of which were carried out to the “t” by the Mexican 
military and police under the direction of civilian governments – one could suggest with all the 
evidence that what happened in Mexico belongs to a strategy called “Low Intensity War” or Low 
Intensity Conflict” (LIW).      
Another element that enables us to maintain that the LIW was applied in Mexico has to 
do with the declaration offered by ex-president Luís Echeverría Álvarez, in power from 1970 – 
1976, who in an interview with the author of this article, in September of 1977 said: “…the 
family of Senator Figueroa didn’t want me to send in the army to free him, but I made the 
decision on my own and sent in the military, behind the back of Lucio Cabañas, so they would 
kick the shit out of him…” This incident happened in 1974, when the peasant and Professor in 
Guerrero took up arms against Lucio Cabañas, decided to kidnap Senator Rubén Figueroa 
Figueroa and demand 50 million pesos (four million dollars at that time) for his release, as well 
as that of several other political prisoners. The military operation resulted in the deployment of 
nearly twenty five thousand troops from the National Army to the state of Guerrero, Lucio 
Cabaña’s political territory, nearly 50% of the troops that saw action that year. This brings us to 
propose the following: if the head of the Mexican Armed Forces is the President of the Republic, 
and he gives the order to act against a civilian who has taken up arms, what do we call that if not 
war.  
On the other hand, at the same time that the “Low Intensity War” was instigated from the 
top down, it also generated and applied a strategy of communication to successfully snuff out the 
social demands called for by the peasant leaders, by the independent unions or student unions, or 
even by the guerrilla leaders who could plant seeds in the conscience of the common people, in 
the learned sectors, or in the middle class in Mexico. Such a tactic was carried out through the 
control of the mass media, and in the cases or situations in which the information got out to the 
public, it was treated as pertaining to the world of common delinquency, relegated to the police 
 report section in the newspapers, information which alluded to those fighting for social justice as 
robbers, snitches, kidnappers, horse thieves, drug addicts, professional agitators, turncoats, and 
allies of the most obscure foreign interests threatening Mexican religion, stability and traditions. 
 One more favorable factor which aided the Mexican state in avoiding the release of 
information and news regarding governmental repression against the common people has to do 
with the fact that since 1939, Mexico had become a safe haven for the politically oppressed from 
other areas of the world. It was then that the first political exiles from the Spanish Civil War 
arrived to Aztec territory, during the six-year presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, who governed 
from 1934 – 1940. Later, under the Estrada Doctrine (a foreign policy doctrine) of “no 
intervention”, the Mexican government maintained distance and was respectful toward the facts 
and situations occurring in different countries around the world. The same held true regarding 
internal affairs particular to those other countries.  Mexico stands out by 1961 as the only Latin 
American country that has not aligned itself with the North American determination to break 
political ties with the emerging Social Republic of Cuba, and at the end of the 1960s and all 
throughout the 1970s it becomes the country that provides political asylum to those persecuted 
due to left leaning ideologies and those threatened by death by the different dictatorships in 
Central and South America. Meanwhile, in the heart of Mexico citizens are dying and are being 
tortured; it doesn’t seem erroneous to ask why Mexicans themselves could never count on a 
Mexican embassy that would provide them with a safe haven.  
There is another key element as to why the idea that the historical inexistence of the 
“Low Intensity War” in Mexico was isolated information, and this has to do with the complicity 
and the unwritten pact between the Mexican and Cuban governments. This pact did not exist 
solely within the official confines of the relationship between the two countries –the socialist 
government in Cuba always demonstrated that the relationship between Mexico and Cuba could 
not deteriorate in the least, negating in this way any type of official recognition of the social, 
political and economic contradictions being expressed in Mexico. One would also have to point 
out the friendship cultivated for years between el Comandante Fidel Castro and Captain 
Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, who was considered the brain behind all of the counter-insurgency 
operations and the “Low Intensity War” waged in Mexico from 1950 – 1985. For this reason, the 
uprisings of the guerrilla movements in Mexico, for example, never counted on the endorsement, 
 which the Cuban government had bestowed on Latin America and even on other countries 
around the world since the 1960s.         
 The repressive mission of the Mexican government is not limited strictly to the period 
considered, the aforementioned “Low Intensity War”, which could be said to extend from 1965 
(the year in which the first outbreak of guerrilla action of an ideological nature took place in the 
city of Madera, in the state of Chihuahua), to 1978 (when political reforms are advocated and the 
participation and expression of the left as a political power is recognized). Even going back to 
the 1940s and 50s, though, repression was felt during the demonstrations held by the different 
labor unions, such as the teachers union, who protested against working conditions and 
governmental control of their union; or when the government acted against the demands of 
railroad workers who wanted the right to elect their own union leaders; or the peasant movement 
led by Rubén Jaramillo, whose end came on May 23, 1962 when he was assassinated, in the 
company of his pregnant wife and three of his four children at the ruins of Xochicalxo in the 
state of Morelos, at the hands national army troops, accompanied by federal and state police 
officers.       
 Nonetheless, there are two dates that have left a major mark as public demonstrations of 
the implementation of the so-called “Low Intensity War”, and they refer to two specific events. 
The first took place on Wednesday, October 2, 1968, when at a gathering in the Plaza de las Tres 
Culturas, in Mexico City, a student demonstration was underway. They were demanding a public 
dialog with the government in order to resolve the different aspects of the charges they had filed 
after having witnessed different types of confrontations, tortures and the detention of young men 
and women, which had in turn caused 41 strikes to break out at various university campuses 
around the country. The government’s response of then president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz was an 
ambush; he placed snipers on the tops of the buildings where the demonstration was taking place, 
and these snipers shot against the army at the very moment they (the army) made their presence 
known in the plaza, to create the illusion that the students had been the ones who had attacked 
the military forces, thus justifying a merciless massacre, which was coincidentally witnessed by 
a large number of international journalists, who were at the protest. They were in Mexico to 
participate in the inauguration of the XIX Olympic Games, which started just ten days after the 
massacre.    
 In spite of the fact that the news of the massacre spread to all the corners of the world on 
Thursday, October 3, 1968, the events were obscured in Mexico, and the media was threatened 
to keep all news out of the press. As far as the international community is concerned, even 
though they had knowledge of the massacre, there were no sanctions, no diplomatic protests, not 
even an act of solidarity in favor of the students who were assassinated and the hundreds of 
detainees and those tortured, for whom the Olympics represented tremendous disillusionment. 
 The second event of public repression in the state of Mexico was carried out on June 10, 
1971, when a group of young paramilitaries trained, financed and under the auspices of the 
federal government, comprised of some one thousand troops known as “Los Halcones”, went 
into action to assault and assassinate students gathered to march in favor of the Universidad 
Autónoma de Nuevo León, outside the Escuela Nacional de Maestros in Mexico City. The 
repressive actions of the paramilitary group were carried out with the consent of the soldiers and 
police present at the gathering, who at no time acted to stop the attack. The terror and 
persecution extended to the hospitals where those injured were taken, when “Los Halcones” 
showed up to beat upon, assassinate and kidnap the students in plain view of the medical staff of 
the Rubén Leñero Clinic. 
In this latter case, President Echeverría denied the existence of the paramilitary group, 
and as always he promised to get to the bottom of the situation to punish the guilty. Echeverría, 
at that moment friend of Salvador Allende, however, not only neglected to carry out any 
investigation, but to add injury to insult he rewarded the executors of that repressive undertaking. 
 The figures associated with the so called “Low Intensity War” in Mexico enable us to 
calculate that from 1969 to 1978, between four and five thousand persons were disappeared or 
assassinated, a number that evidently falls below the twenty five thousand in Guatemala, or the 
thirty thousand in Argentina; without a doubt, though, it’s useless to even mention a comparison 
of numbers regarding the disgrace of hundreds of families who saw their dreams truncated and 
turned into nightmares.    
 During that same period we know that in the nation at large a total of 37 different armed 
revolutionary groups were in action. In all of these cases this came after a long process of 
endeavoring to act in a legal fashion, but faced with the official obstinacy, the police persecution, 
 and the voice of violence, these groups opted for armed self-defense movements, establishing 
different programs to attempt to modify the social, economic and political structures in Mexico. 
 Curiously it is in 1994, with the rise of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
(EZLN), that light is shed on the fact that the situation of the majority of the Mexican population 
is deteriorating; in addition a focus is targeted at rescuing part of the concealed history of Mexico 
of the XX century. 
 During Vicente Fox’s rule, in 2003, the position of a special public prosecutor was 
created to investigate the probable crimes of the past at the hands of the authorities, but the 
complicity between the traditional political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 
which ruled Mexico for 71 years, and the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), which carried Fox to 
the presidency in the year 2000, closed all avenues for bringing to justice those responsible for 
the “Low Intensity War”, thus providing impunity for state terrorism.    
 While in the various Latin American countries processes of reconciliation have been 
engaged, and justice administered to heal the old wounds occasioned by the so-called “Dirty 
Wars”, the case of Mexico lags behind to this day. In spite of the violation of human rights it is a 
history whose voice is still silent, generating in this way a condition of broken years.  
 
Notes 
[1] The particularities of syntax and puncutation in the original have been maintained in this 
translation, to the best of my ability, to accurately reflect Glockner’s style. 
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